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LAW AS A WEAPON. 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN THE LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 




University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy) 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper presents some aspects of the legal and philosophical thought of the 
American jurist Catharine MacKinnon, with a particular focus on her negative anthropology and 
on the reclaiming power of rights. Specific attention will also be given to her view of equality, 
which refuses the formal logic of the Aristotelian formula (“treating likes alike and unlikes 
unalike”) in order to emphasise the substantive elements rooted in the social background. Finally, 
some critical remarks and conclusive reflections will be presented. 
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RESUMEN: Este trabajo presenta algunos aspectos del pensamento jurídico y filosόfico de la 
jurista estadounidense Catharine MacKinnon, con una atención  particular a su antropología 
negativa y al poder reivindicativo de los derechos. También se presta especial atenciόn a su visiόn 
de la igualidad, que rechaza la lόgica formal de la fόrmula aristotélica (“tratar igual a los iguales 
y desigual a los desiguales”) con el fin de enfatizar los elementos sustanciales arrigados en el 
trasfondo social. Al final se presentan algunos comentarios críticos y reflexiones conclusivas. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Catharine MacKinnon, igualdad aristotélica, igualdad sustancial, Derecho. 
 
“Ares, god of warfare, lives in women too” 
Sophocles, Electra 
 
1. A “realist” method 
Forty years from the first pioneering publication of Catharine MacKinnon’s book Sexual 
Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1979), this piece intends to propose a reflection on the legal and 
philosophical thought of an author who for over four decades managed to remain at the 
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apex of the international scientific community1 and, at the same time, gain notoriety 
among the wider public thanks to her role in some famous legal battles2. 
In a critical analysis of the American jurist’s entire, vast corpus of writings, this work 
provides some epistemic observations of her investigative method (§ 1). Subsequently it 
deals with an approach which, from an essentially negative anthropology, aims to foster 
a society which leverages the “reclaiming” potential of rights meant in an affirmative 
sense and not possessive or atomistic (§ 2). The article continues with a reflection on the 
crucial evolution from formal equality, defined as “Aristotelian”, to the promotion of 
substantive equality (§ 3). Finally, some critical objections and conclusive remarks will 
be presented (§ 4). 
First, however, an unavoidable problem that has been repeatedly raised in the 
literature3 must be addressed. This is the choice of a self-conceived analytical 
                                                          
1 Catharine MacKinnon has been invited to hold the opening plenary Lecture at the Internationale 
Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie World Congress 2019 on “Dignity, Democracy and 
Diversity” in Lucerne (on 8th July 2019). Moreover, an entry entitled MacKinnon, Catharine A., written by 
DAVID M. PEÑA-GUZMÁN, has been included in the IVR Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and 
Social Philosophy, ed. by M. SELLERS AND S. KIRSTE (Springer: 
<https://www.springer.com/la/book/9789400765184>). 
2 From the legal recognition of sexual harassment as an illegal act at the end of the 1970s, to the fight 
to ban pornography in the 1980s (a controversy that led to repeated debates between her and Ronald 
Dworkin) to more recent issues concerning human rights, such as the case Kadic v. Karadzic tried in the 
United States in 2000 under the Alien Tort Statute, in which the American lawyer represented Croatian and 
Bosnian women victims of Serb genocide. In reference to this see C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2017, pp. 140-161. 
3 Considering the Italian literature, see: TH. CASADEI, Diritto e (dis)parità. Dalla discriminazione di 
genere alla democrazia paritaria, Aracne, Roma, 2017, in part. pp. 63-72; B.H. BIX, Teoria del diritto. 
Idee e contesti (2015), Italian trans. ed. by A. PORCIELLO, Giappichelli, Torino, 2016, pp. 305-312; G. 
MANIACI, Aporie e distorsioni del femminismo radicale, in “Diritto e Questioni pubbliche”, 2, 2016, pp. 
339-364; A. FACCHI, Stereotipi, discriminazioni, diritti. A proposito delle tesi di Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, in TH. CASADEI (a cura di), Donne, diritto, diritti. Prospettive del giusfemminismo, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2015, pp. 63-75; L. RE, Lo stereotipo della “differenza sessuale”. Analisi di un 
fraintendimento in Catharine A. MacKinnon, in TH. CASADEI (a cura di), Donne, diritto, diritti. 
Prospettive del giusfemminismo, cit., pp. 77-94; S. VANTIN, Le violenze domestiche nelle riflessioni di 
Catharine MacKinnon. Un tentativo di applicazione entro il contesto legislativo e giurisprudenziale 
europeo, in “Diritto & Questioni pubbliche”, 2015, pp. 236-241; S. VANTIN, La funzione simbolica del 
diritto nelle riflessioni di MacKinnon a partire da Le donne sono umane? Il caso della pornografia, in 
“Jura Gentium. Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale”, 1, 2014, pp. 85-94; 
the focus edited by A. FACCHI, Autonomia, realtà, diritto: a partire dal femminismo di Catharine 
MacKinnon / Reality, Autonomy, Law: Starting from Catharine MacKinnon’s Feminism, in “Rivista di 
Filosofia del diritto”, 2, 2013, pp. 335-378, with contributions by C. GARCÍA PASCUAL (Liberazione 
senza autonomia: pp. 339-352), V. OTTONELLI (La sparizione delle donne come soggetti e le sue 
conseguenze politiche: pp. 353-366) and I. TRUJILLO (Universalità, realismo e diritti. Su alcuni contributi 
del femminismo alla filosofia del diritto: pp. 367-378); T. PITCH, A proposito di “Le donne sono umane?” 
Di Catharine MacKinnon, in “Sociologia del diritto”, 3, 2012, pp. 161-162; the focus published in “Jura 
Gentium. Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale”, 2012-2013, with 
contributions by A. BESUSSI, A. FACCHI (Introduzione all’edizione italiana di Le donne sono umane?), 
B. CASALINI (Spunti per una lettura critica di Le donne sono umane? di Catharine MacKinnon) and L. 
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methodology as “realist”, which, when moving from the empirical observation of reality, 
arrives at the revelation of the artificial constructions of domination, accepting the risk of 
proclaiming itself ideological. Each and every objective or “objectifying” viewpoint is 
rejected on a theoretical basis; the “subjective” assumption appears to MacKinnon to be 
an irrefutable fact, to the point that she herself does not avoid tautologies or 
simplifications: a subject’s point of view cannot not be subjective4. In this sense, the 
jurist’s entire theoretical thought is based on the urgent need to eradicate the hierarchical 
constructions of dominion and imbalance, which have been imposed on subjugated 
groups, in order to promote effective and factual equality. 
 
We will be told that our approach […] is not neutral. But existing laws, and existing 
social reality, are already not neutral. The question is, on what side is nonneutrality going 
to fall: to maintain inequality or to promote equality? The choice is between existing law 
– which is neutral from the standpoint of the advantaged and nonneutral from the 
standpoint of the disadvantaged – and the alternative, which, written from the viewpoint 
of the disadvantaged, may be considered nonneutral from the advantaged standpoint. The 
question is whether you want the problem of inequality solved. You can’t solve the 
problem of disadvantage from the standpoint of dominance. You can solve it from the 
standpoint of the disadvantaged. In a hierarchical situation, neutrality really is not 
available5.  
 
Therefore, this so-called objective or neutral viewpoint is nothing other than «the 
velvet glove on the iron fist of domination»6: in its «bafflingly abstract»7 nature, it reflects 
«the status quo in law»8. Instead, the “realist” view is the one that acknowledges social 
                                                          
RE (La violenza e il diritto. Riflessioni a partire da Le donne sono umane? di Catharine A. MacKinnon), 
available at: <https://www.juragentium.org/topics/women/>; A. VERZA, Il dominio pornografico: 
femminismo e liberalismo alla prova, Liguori, Napoli, 2006. 
The following works of MacKinnon have been translated into Italian: C.A. MACKINNON, Le donne 
sono umane?, eds. by A. BESUSSI, A. FACCHI, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2012; Ead., Soltanto parole, Giuffrè, 
Milano, 1999; Ead., Nei tribunali statunitensi una legge delle donne per le donne, in “Democrazia e diritto”, 
2, 1993, pp. 203-224. 
4 See, e.g., C.A. MACKINNON, Le donne sono umane?, cit., pp. 15-17. 
5 C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit., p. 124. See also Ead., Towards a Feminist Theory of the 
State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989, p. 249. 
6 C.A. MACKINNON, Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1987, p. 8. 




hierarchies9, by accepting the nexus between reality and power, by force of which those 
who are excluded from the latter do not possess the authentic capacity to influence the 
real world itself10. Its «goal is to legally confront real social inequalities and conditions 
in order to end them. Its agenda is change»11. In this regard, Hannah Arendt’s essay On 
Violence seems recalled, where it is asserted, in referring to Jean-Paul Sartre, that the 
dreams of the oppressed will never come true12. Thus, law cannot «just sit there and sort 
the legal world into the same piles the social world has already sorted it into»13. According 
to MacKinnon, legal equality should act as an «Archimedean lever on social inequality», 
as «a way to move an unequal world»14. 
This attitude proves the interrelation between law and society, conceived as a unique 
«seamless web»15. The legal structures are permeated by the same hierarchical logic 
which pervades society16. To this extent the case of sex inequality is particularly 
emblematic. 
 
Equality is a sameness and gender is a difference. To define equality in terms of 
sameness and women as “not the same” thus raises the question whether women will be 
equal under this approach only when they are no longer women. To consider this question 
is not to affirm women’s sameness to men or women’s differences from men, but to face 
a conflict at the point of intersection between the ruling equality paradigm and the social 
                                                          
9 See C.A. MACKINNON, Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law, cit., pp. 46-62. 
10 C.A. MACKINNON, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, cit., p. 122. To this extent, see also A. 
FACCHI, Diritto e potere nel femminismo, in G. BONGIOVANNI, G. PINO, C. ROVERSI (a cura di), 
Che cosa è il diritto. Ontologie e concezioni del giuridico, Giappichelli, Torino, pp. 475-500. 
11 C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit., p. 119. 
12 See H. ARENDT, On Violence, Harcourt, Orlando, 1970, p. 12: «the point […] is that dreams [of the 
oppressed] never come true. The rarity of slave-rebellions and of uprisings among the disinherited and 
downtrodden is notorious; on the few occasions when they occurred it was precisely “mad fury” that turned 
dreams into nightmares for everybody. In no case, so far as I know, was the force of these “volcanic” 
outbursts, in Sartre’s words, “equal to that of the pressure put on them”». 
13 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, Foundation Press, New York, 2001, p. 32. 
14 Ibidem. 
15 Ivi, p. 23. 
16 See C.A. MACKINNON, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, cit., p. 237: «A jurisprudence is a 
theory of the relation between life and law. […] When life becomes law in such a system, the transformation 
is both formal and substantive. It renders life marked by power. In male supremacist societies […] law 
becomes legitimate, and social dominance becomes invisible. Liberal legalism is thus a medium for making 
male dominance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the same time 
as it enforces that view on society». 
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definition of women as such. Sex equality, so understood, appears to be a contradiction 
in terms17. 
 
Although MacKinnon’s analyses focus on equality in many aspects, assuming 
different group’s perspectives18, the point of view of women is therefore particularly 
addressed. It appears to be extremely relevant because «the group women, composed of 
all its variations, has a collective social history of group-based devaluation, 
disempowerment, exploitation, and subordination that extends to the present»19. 
Moreover, the «widely documented» «second-class status of women»20 shows some 
intrinsic aporias of the legal reasoning and equality rule. Following this path, the 
sometimes epiphanous revelation of violent and discriminatory practices towards women 
leads, on the one hand, to the creation of a global female community, built in 
universalistic terms on the cultural commonalities of gender; on the other hand, it fosters 
a collective language that is able to assign common names to persecutions. It is a legal 
glossary, a fluid vocabulary that changes with the reality it is regulating, massively 
affecting the cognitive process as well as the exercise of power of which it is an 
expression21. 
MacKinnon states therefore that the «first step is to claim women’s concrete reality», 
while the second stage is recognizing that «male forms of power over women are 
affirmatively embodied as individual rights in law»22. Subsequently, «equality will 
require change – not reflection – a new jurisprudence, a new relation between life and 
law»23. 
                                                          
17 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 20. See also Ead., Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, 
cit., p. 242. 
18 In particular, she focused on sex, race, sexual orientation and, more recently, disability: see, for 
example, C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit., p. 112. 
19 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 2. See also the historical itinerary described by CARLA 
FARALLI, in Donne e diritti. Un’introduzione storica, in TH. CASADEI (a cura di), Donne, diritti, diritto. 
Prospettive del giusfemminismo, cit., pp. 1-13; and M.C. BARRANCO AVILÉS, Feminismos del siglo XX, 
in F.J. ANSUÁTEGUI ROIG, J.M. RODRÍGUEZ URIBES, G. PECES-BARBA MARTÍNEZ, E. 
FERNÁNDEZ GARCÍA (coord. por), Historia de los derechos fundamentales, Dykinson, Madrid, 1998, 
vol. IV, tomo II F, pp. 731-772. 
20 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 2. 
21 See A. BESUSSI, A. FACCHI, Introduzione all’edizione italiana, in C.A. MACKINNON, Le donne 
sono umane?, cit., pp. V-XVIII. 
22 C.A. MACKINNON, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, cit., p. 244. 
23 Ivi, p. 249. 
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For this reason, with at times rhetorical assertions, she invokes the revision of the 
standard of humanity24 implied in the legal subjectivity or in the status of citizenship25. 
Quoting the words of Richard Rorty, according to the positive legislation, to be a woman 
«is not yet the name of a way of being human»26. «Women’s lives [are not properly] 
“human” by the standard set by men, [because] women’s reality has not been reflected in 
the standard for what “human” is»27. 
By fostering the inclusion of the female in the legal sphere, the lawyer believes she 
can change the legal space and along with that the social reality associated with it28, thus 
promoting a rebalancing of power relations, in a virtuous process contributing to the 
redefining of hierarchies of power that structure reality. 
 
2. From a negative anthropology to the “reclaiming” power of rights  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote that «[t]he strongest is never strong enough to be always 
the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty»29, where 
«the pistol he holds is also a power»30. 
The reciprocal influence of violence, power and law provides an interpretative key 
which could be used to look at the entire history of western political and legal thought. It 
is well known that starting from an analysis of these aspects, some authors have 
interpreted human anthropology as essentially “negative”. In this regard Carl Schmitt 
asserted that 
 
What remains is the remarkable and, for many, certainly disquieting diagnosis that all 
genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil, i.e. by no means an unproblematic 
but a dangerous and dynamic being. […] It suffices here to cite Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
                                                          
24 Ivi, p. 247; Ead., Sex Equality, cit., p. 3; C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit., pp. 325-331. 
25 With reference to the constitutional aspects, see C.A. MACKINNON (ed.), Gender in Constitutional 
Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 3 vols., 2018. 
26 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 3. 
27 Ibidem. About this issue, see also C.A. MACKINNON, Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005. 
28 This aspect is clearly analysed with reference to the concern of pornography: see C.A. 
MACKINNON, Only Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, and, for a specific 
comment, S. VANTIN, La funzione simbolica del diritto nelle riflessioni di MacKinnon a partire da Le 
donne sono umane? Il caso della pornografia, cit.  
29 J.J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract (1762), Early Modern Text, 
<http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf>, p. 2. 
30 Ivi, p. 3. 
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Bousset, Fichte (as soon as he forgets his humanitarian idealism), de Maistre, Donoso 
Cortés, H. Taine, and even Hegel, who, to be sure, at times also shows his double face31. 
 
MacKinnon also returns to the conviction that humanity is moved by the instinct to 
dominate others. To this extent, the American scholar subverts the logic of creationism, 
in that on the first day of all time the dominant position was obtained through the use of 
force. On the second day the consequent distinction between dominators and dominated 
was marked; and on the third day the difference between the two groups was strengthened 
and absolutized so as to delineate a clear separation between roles. The dominators thus 
created legal systems to legitimize and preserve their power: the legal scaffolding of 
social reality began like a «pistol», a weapon, to be used for technical purposes32.  
This is an unequivocally dichotomous, conflictual world view, with a public and 
political impact: expressions that according to MacKinnon are always associated with 
power and dominion and are hence comparable to the Schmittian juxtaposition of Freund 
and Feind33. 
That the strongest tend to subjugate the weakest to preserve their own position of 
strength appears to the author to be a “natural” law, albeit in the non-deontic sense, but 
as a physical law, antecedent to all orders and obligations, in force in the sphere of sein 
and not sollen34. The only chance for the oppressed to escape this state of subjugation 
thus seems to fight with the arsenal at hand to obtain access to power and its practical 
                                                          
31 C. SCHMITT, The Concept of the Political (1927), expanded ed., The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago-London, 2007, p. 61. 
32 See, to this extent, E. LAGERSPETZ, The Opposite Mirrors. An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory 
of Institutions, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995 and GF. ZANETTI, Eguaglianza come prassi. Teoria 
dell’argomentazione normativa, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, pp. 45-68.  
33 C. SCHMITT, The Concept of the Political, cit., p. 28: «The enemy is not merely any competitor or 
just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy 
exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. 
The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of 
men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship. The enemy is hostis, 
not inimicus in the broader sense». 
34 See, on these aspects, J. FEINBERG, Duties, Rights and Claims, in “American Philosophical 
Quarterly”, 3, 1966, pp. 137-144 and L. BACCELLI, Il particolarismo dei diritti. Poteri degli individui e 
paradossi dell’universalismo, Carocci, Roma, 1999, p. 48. 
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manifestation. If the law is a weapon35 then women must learn to brandish it. Only in this 
sort of future horizon, along the lines of Arendt, will power not be violence36. 
To launch this dynamic, women, who are individually oppressed and as fragile as 
butterflies37, must leverage the “reclaiming” potential of rights thus re-founding the law. 
The result will be the creation of a community, invincible in its collective and plural 
strength, like the whole species of the lepidoptera’s order. Reclaiming rights will 
therefore imply overcoming the atomistic point of view. The redemption of the oppressed 
can only occur by force of numbers, not by means of a possessive logic (rights are not 
individual properties) but rather by an affirmative one (rights as claims of groups).  
Moreover, in these terms the «butterfly effect» also represents the flow of 
discriminated people’s legal conquests. A batting of wings can provoke a tornado, but as 
Edward Lorenz explained in 196238, it is not easy to foresee where or when. MacKinnon’s 
teachings embrace this awareness: the mountain should be moved, and it will be up to 
those who come after us to evaluate and incur the benefits of the landslides39. 
While MacKinnon’s earlier writings focused mainly on the theoretical analysis of the 
conditions of female subjugation40 and single practical battles41, more recently her field 
of action seems to have broadened. Her exhortations in defence of the inclusion of the 
female point of view in the legal sphere has becoming increasingly vast and plural, 
covering criminal law (torture, human trafficking, prostitution, rape, and domestic 
                                                          
35 The expression is by Alessandra Facchi: see C.A. MACKINNON, Le donne sono umane?, eds. by A. 
BESUSSI, A. FACCHI, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2012, p. XIII. 
36 H. ARENDT, On Violence, cit., p. 56: «politically speaking it is insufficient to say that power and 
violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is 
absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s 
disappearance». For further readings, see M.C. BARRANCO AVÍLES, Condicion humana y derechos 
humanos. Algunas claves filosoficas para un modelo contemporaneo de derechos, Dykinson, Madrid, 2016; 
S. FORTI, Hannah Arendt tra filosofia e politica, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2006; TH. CASADEI, Dal 
dispotismo al totalitarismo: Hannah Arendt, in D. FELICE, Dispotismo. Genesi e sviluppi di un concetto 
filosofico-politico, Liguori, Napoli, 2001, pp. 625-673. 
37 This is the metaphor which gives the title to C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit. 
38 See ivi, p. 1. 
39 Ivi, pp. 325-331. 
40 See C.A. MACKINNON, Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law, cit; Ead., Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State, cit.; Ead., Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the Sate: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, in “Signs”, 4, 1983, pp. 635-658. 
41 In particular: sexual harassment and pornography. See C.A. MACKINNON, Pornography as Sex 
Discrimination, in “Law & Inequality”, 1, 1986, pp. 38-49; Ead., Pornography: Social Sciences, Legal and 
Clinical Perspectives, in “Law and Inequality”, 4, 1986, pp. 17-49; Ead., Sexual Harassment of Working 




violence)42, international and humanitarian law (genocide and wartime sexual crimes)43, 
discrimination law (sexual harassment, pornography and intersectional discrimination)44, 
                                                          
42 See C.A. MACKINNON, Rape Redefined, in “Harvard Law and Policy Review”, 2, 2016, pp. 431-
77; Ead. (co-author C.K. NANA), Sexual Violence, in J. KRIEGER (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
Comparative Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 359-364; Ead., Trafficking, Prostitution, 
and Inequality, in “Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review”, 2, 2011, pp. 271-309; Ead., Defining 
Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu, in “Columbia Journal of Transnational Law”, 3, 2006, pp. 
940-958; Ead., A Sex Equality Approach to Sexual Assault, in A. PRENTKY et al., Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, New York Academy of Sciences, New York, vol. 989, 2003, pp. 265-275; Ead., 
Violence against Women Act: 108 Stat. 1903 (1994), in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, 
Macmillan Reference USA, New York, vol. 6, 2000, p. 2797; Ead., Prostitution and Civil Rights, in 
“Michigan Journal of Gender & Law”, 1, 1993, pp. 13-31. 
43 See C.A. MACKINNON, Creating International Law: Gender as Leading Edge in “Harvard Journal 
of Law & Gender”, 1, 2013, pp. 105-121; Ead., Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006; Ead., International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza, & Ngeze. Case No. ICTR 99-52-T. Judgment and Sentence, in “American Journal of 
International Law”, 2, 2004, pp. 325-330; Ead., Are Women Human?, in B. VAN DER HEIJDEN, B. 
TAZHIB-LIE (eds.), Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1998, pp. 71-72; Ead., Remedies for War Crimes at the National Level, in “Journal of International 
Institute”, 1, 1998, pp. 1-23; Ead, Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights, in “Harvard Women’s 
Law Journal”, 17, 1994, pp. 5-16. 
44 See C.A. MACKINNON, Women’s Lives in Men’s Courts: Briefs for Change, Twelve Tables Press, 
Northport, N.Y., forthcoming; Ead., Intersectionality as Method: A Note, in “Signs”, 4, 2013, pp. 1019-
1030; Ead., Voice, Heart, Ground, in A. RICHARDS, C. GREENBERG (eds.), I Still Believe Anita Hill: 
Three Generations Discuss the Legacies of Speaking Truth to Power, The Feminist Press, New York, 2013, 
pp. 71-74; Ead., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, in “Nova Law Review”, 2, 2007, pp. 225-236; Ead., 
Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws, cit.; Ead., Pornography as Trafficking, in “Michigan Journal of International 
Law”, 4, 2005, pp. 993-1012; Ead., Only Words, cit.; Ead. (co-edited with R.B. SIEGEL), Directions in 
Sexual Harassment Law, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004; Ead., The Logic of Experience: 
Reflections on the Development of Sexual Harassment Law, in “Georgetown Law Journal”, 3, 2002, pp. 
813-833; Ead., Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment, II, in Encyclopedia of the American 
Constitution, Macmillan Reference USA, New York, vol. 6, 2000, p. 2926; Ead., Collective Harms under 
the Alien Tort Statute: A Cautionary Note on Class Actions, in “ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law”, 2, 2000, pp. 567-574; Ead. (co-edited with A. DWORKIN), In Harm’s Way: The 
Pornography Civil Rights Hearing, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997; Ead., From Practice 
to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, in R. DELGADO, J. STEFANCIC (eds.), Critical White 
Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1997, pp. 300-304; Ead., 
Vindication and Resistance: A Response to the Carnegie-Mellon Study of Pornography in Cyberspace, in 
“Georgetown Law Journal”, 5, 1995, pp. 1959-1967; Ead., Pornography: An Exchange, in “New York 
Review of Books”, 5, 1994, pp. 47-48; Ead., Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide, in 
“Ms. Magazine”, 1, 1993, pp. 24-30; Ead., Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, in “Boston 
University Law Review”, 71, 1991, pp. 793-815. 
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constitutional law and general theory of law (gender and constitutions, substantive 
equality)45, but also legal culture and education (sex equality in legal education)46. 
In an endless mass of pages, case notes and court reports47, those listed are the issues 
MacKinnon seems to indicate as priorities. The redefinition of law in a “reclaiming” and 
“re-founding” approach, instrumental in empowering the oppressed group of women, 
must begin with this. 
 
3. From Aristotelian equality to substantive equality  
As already stated above, according to MacKinnon, the male exercise of power has 
generated a sort of logical paradox in defining the equality rule: if the principle of equality 
is indeed conceived as one of the pillars of western legal orders, it is still rarely realized 
                                                          
45 See C.A. MACKINNON, The First Amendment: An Equality Reading, in L. BOLLINGER, G. 
STONE (eds.), The Free Speech Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, pp. 140-61; Ead., 
Substantive Equality Past and Future: The Canadian Charter Experience, in R. ALBERT, D.R. 
CAMERON (eds.), Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 227-44; Ead. (ed.), Gender in Constitutional Law, cit.; 
Ead., Butterfly Politics, cit.; Ead., Substantive Equality Revisited: A Reply to Sandra Fredman, in 
“International Journal of Constitutional Law”, 3, 2016, pp. 739-746; Ead., Sex Equality Controversies: The 
Formosa Lectures, National Taiwan University Press, Taipei, 2015; Ead., Toward a Renewed Equal Rights 
Amendment: Now More Than Ever, in “Harvard Journal of Law & Gender”, 2, 2014, pp. 569-579; Ead., 
Martinez Revisited, in K.A. CARPENTER, M.L.M. FLETCHER, A.R. RILEY (eds.), The Indian Civil 
Rights Act at Forty, UCLA American Indian Studies Center, Los Angeles, 2012, pp. 27-38; Ead., Gender 
in Constitutions, in M. ROSENFELD, A. SAJÒ (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 397-416; Ead., Substantive Equality: A 
Perspective, cit.; Ead., Sex Equality under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and “Personal 
Laws”, in “International Journal of Constitutional Law”, 2, 2006, pp. 181-202; Ead., The Road Not To 
Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, in “Ohio State Law Journal”, 5, 2004, pp. 1081-1095; Ead., 
Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, in “Yale Law Journal”, 100, 1991, pp. 1281-1328; Ead., Sex 
Equality and Nation Building in Canada: The Meech Lake Accord, in “Tulsa Law Journal”, 25, 1990, pp. 
735-757. 
46 See C.A. MACKINNON, Response to Five Philosophers: Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 
Some Decades Later, in “Feminist Philosophy”, 2, 2017, pp. 1-18; Ead., Introduction to Symposium on 
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, in “Law & Inequality”, 2, 2017, pp. 255-264; Ead., In Their Hands: 
Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, in “Yale Law Journal”, 7, 2016, pp. 
2038-2105; Ead., Dahl’s Feminism?, in “Journal of Political Power”, 2, 2015, pp. 249-260; Ead., 
Shakespeare’s Sister in Philosophy and Reality: A Response, in “APA Newsletter. Newsletter on 
Philosophy and Law”, 2, 2013, pp. 16-22; Ead., Raising Hell, Making Miracles: The Everlovin’ Legal 
Imagination of Ann Scales, in “Denver University Law Review”, 1, 2013, pp. 13-21; Ead., Engaged 
Scholarship as Method and Vocation, in “Yale Journal of Law & Feminism”, 2, 2010, pp. 193-205; Ead., 
X-Underrated, in “Times - Higher Education Supplement”, 1692, 2005, pp. 18-19; Ead., Mainstreaming 
Feminism in Legal Education, in “Journal of Legal Education”, 2, 2003, pp. 199-212; Ead., From Practice 
to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway? (Feminism in the 90’s: Bridging the Gap between Theory 
and Practice), in “Yale Journal of Law & Feminism”, 4, 1991, pp. 13-22; Ead., Does Sexuality Have a 
History?, in “Michigan Quarterly Review”, 30, 1991, pp. 1-11. 
47 See the impressive editions of the huge case book Sex Equality (3rd ed. Foundation Press, St. Paul, 
Minn., 2016; 2nd ed. Foundation Press, New York, 2007; 1st ed. cit.), made up respectively of 1982, 1571 
and 1651 pages. 
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since it is formulated in ambiguous and contradictory terms in the wake of the Aristotelian 
enunciation, which has become the linchpin of analogical juridical logic48: «treating likes 
alike and unlikes unalike»49. 
The jurist explains: 
 
[T]here is a group here that sets a standard. Then there is a group that is supposed to 
meet that standard. But the group that sets the standard is unlikely ever to be in the 
position that the group that needs something done is in. Whenever that occurs, whenever 
you have an inequality […] you don’t have an equality argument. The dominant measure 
is set by advantaged peoples. To the extent that a disadvantaged person is close to that 
measure, they are “the same”; therefore their unequal treatment is an inequality. But to 
the extent they are close to that measure, the same, they are far less likely to have an 
inequality problem that needs to be addressed at all. To the extent the disadvantaged 
person’s situation is far from that measure, thus are likely to have an equality problem 
that needs to be addressed, but they are likely to be considered “different”. Hence not 
unequally treated. […] In other words, only when some actual social parity between 
advantaged and disadvantaged occurs will this equality argument work to challenge 
whatever disadvantage remains. Only when it is not really needed will it be available. It’s 
a trap50. 
 
This kind of so-called «mainstream»51 equality is also described as «formal», 
«Aristotelian»52. It could be referred to the famous excerpt from Politics, in which the 
Greek philosopher defines isonomia (equality under law) basically maintaining that, as 
far as a polity is being constituted, equality means that all who are similar as citizens 
should enjoy similar basic privileges, such as ruling53. This idea became important in 
                                                          
48 See also L. GIANFORMAGGIO, Eguaglianza, donne e diritto, eds. by A. FACCHI, C. FARALLI, 
T. PITCH, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, in part. pp. 33-61. For a further reading on these aspects in the thought 
of Letizia Gianformaggio, see C. FARALLI, Diritti ed eguaglianza. La rilettura di Letizia Gianformaggio, 
in O. GIOLO, P. PASTORE, Diritto, potere e ragione nel pensiero di Letizia Gianformaggio, Iovene, 
Napoli, 2016, pp. 41-42. 
49 C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit., p. 111. 
50 Ivi, pp. 115-116. 
51 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 4. 
52 Ibidem. See also C.A. MACKINNON, Substantive Equality. A Perspective, cit., p. 5; Ead., Butterfly 
Politics, cit., pp. 296-297, 306, 308-312. 
53 ARISTOTELE, Politica, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2000, pp. 86, 108. For an accurate analysis of Aritotle’s 
idea of justice, see GF. ZANETTI, La nozione di giustizia in Aristotele, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1993; Id., 
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legal thinking, being conceptualized as an empirical (how one ought to be treated is based 
on the way one is) and symmetrical (as if on two sides of an equation conjoined with a 
mathematical sign of equivalence) truth54. 
MacKinnon states however that, firstly the warning about equal treatment of equals 
does not consider the perimeter of inclusion, and thus exclusion, separating those who are 
predefined as “equal” and those who are “different”. Thus the problem of justifying the 
criteria is avoided, leaving the “power to define” in the hands of the powerful55. «Aristotle 
does not defend his comparative empirical approach on normative grounds: he does not 
ask why one must be the same as someone else before one ought to receive equal 
consideration or benefit»56. 
Secondly, the logic of the Stagirite requires the adaptation of treatment of one group 
to the treatment reserved for another group according to the principle “B should be treated 
as A”. Considering this example, “A” remains a sort of standard and evaluative reference 
parameter. This «equality approach does not specify the reference points for sameness of 
treatment»57. Such an observation is peculiarly clear in the case of sex inequality, where 
the legal parameter is typically male and the feminine condition should be measured with 
reference to the male standard58. With a metaphor that takes up that formulated by 
Germaine Greer in The Female Eunuch (1970)59, MacKinnon recalls the anatomy models 
at a school of medicine: the human body is male, and all the other peculiarities that 
characterize the female body are studied in gynaecology 60. 
Thirdly, it should be emphasised that equality could result, as an output, from a specific 
discriminatory historical background. «If people have been kept unequal, they will often 
                                                          
Ragion pratica e diritto. Un percorso aristotelico / Practical Reason and Law. An Aritotelian Itinerary, 
Giuffè, Milano, 2001, in part. pp. 41-65.  
54 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., pp. 4-5. 
55 See C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 3, where the author explains that the Rule of law 
embodies the equality rule, because everyone should be treated “equally” before the law, without favours 
or prejudices. She adds: «In the West since the Enlightenment ‒ building on the Greek’s concept of 
“isonomia”, equality under law ‒ law as law has meant equalization by uniform rules over the inequalities 
of force and social hierarchy. […] On another level, reasoning through analogy and distinction makes a 
notion of equality methodological in law. An equality norm of sameness for the same (analogy) and 
difference for the different (distinction) is built into legal reasoning itself».  
56 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 6. 
57 Ivi, p. 7. 
58 C.A. MACKINNON, Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law, cit., pp. 32-45. 
59 G. GREER, The Female Eunuch (1970), Bantam Books, London, 1972, p. 21. 
60 C.A. MACKINNON, Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law, cit., pp. 32-45. 
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be unequal»61. In other words, past oppressive conditions have an impact in reproducing 
inequalities and disadvantages, so that “being” different can be a consequence of a 
previous discrimination – a view which is close to that kind of «equality as a goal» that 
Jeremy Waldron has subsequently made famous in his essay God, Locke and Equality 
(2002)62. 
Moreover, the Aristotelian equality looks «indeterminate» and, in this sense, 
«perverse»63, because it can be applied to a situation as well as to its opposite, with equal 
logical consistency. The case of a pregnant worker is a typical example of this 
ambivalence: according to MacKinnon, who refers to the jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court, a law providing special labour protection could be conceived both as 
discrimination based on sex or as non-discrimination based on sex depending merely on 
the Court’s findings64. 
For all these reasons, 
 
[t]he Aristotelian approach to equality tends to reproduce inequality by seeing the 
products of dominance as “difference”. Its blindness to hierarchy makes it incapable of 
producing determinate outcomes in opposition to inequality; it will tend systematically to 
produce outcomes that reinforce and reproduce social inequality. […] Against major or 
structural social inequality, it is impotent, even regressive65. 
 
                                                          
61 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 7.  
62 J. WALDRON, God, Locke and Equality. Christian Foundation in Locke’s Political Thought, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002. For an analysis, see GF. ZANETTI, Eguaglianza come 
prassi. Teoria dell’argomentazione normativa, cit., in part. p. 38. 
63 C.A. MACKINNON, Substantive Equality. A Perspective, cit., pp. 5-6. 
64 Ivi, p. 9. About this logical ambiguity, see also ivi, pp. 12-13: «[g]ender is the unequal social system 
attributed to sex, the central myth of which is that gender hierarchy is natural. Sex, in reality, is an equality, 
the sexes being equally similar or equally different as well as equally human. It is gender, the social reality 
of sex, that makes men and women, the beings assigned a sex and ascribed a gender accordingly, into 
unequals in a hierarchy relative to one another». About this issue, see also C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly 
Politics, cit., p. 295. With reference to the example of the pregnant woman, see Sex Equality, cit., pp. 300-
301, 385-428 and, in the Italian literature, inter alia, I. CASTANGIA, G. BIAGIONI (a cura di), Il principio 
di non discriminazione nel diritto dell’Unione Europea, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2011, p. 67. 
65 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 10. See ivi, p. 8: the author indeed recalls that the United 
States preserved this formula for equality during the era of racial segregation as well as during the period 
of its rejection. In the same way the German constitutional court condemned Nazi racial laws on the basis 
of the same formulation of equality that the Nazi’s had used (to support their theories). In fact, the principle 
remains the same: those who are equal are treated equally, while those who are different are treated 




By this route the author arrives at a reformulation of the concept of equality in 
substantial terms, intending it as an absence of dominion66. In addition to this negative 
aspect, however, she adds a positive obligation, which through groups’ reclaiming actions 
must be brought to the attention of the institutions: the fundamental purpose of the social 
community is to foster substantive equality, compensating for the spontaneous tension 
surrounding the subjugation of the weak, typical of human nature67. Thus, looking at the 
example of the Black civil rights movement, she emphasises the aspiration to transform 
social hierarchies from the bottom up. Understanding social inequality as pervasive rather 
than exceptional, she adopts the view that «law has done, it must undo, and what it has 
not rectified, it should»68. 
The new paradigm of substantive equality found a first jurisprudential recognition in 
the 1989 Andrews vs. Law Society of British Columbia case69, before the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The suit was brought under the equality provisions of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (1985), whose Section 15 provided “Equality Rights”. The decision 
recognized the value of formal equality, but rejected it as defining the core meaning of 
the legal equality guarantees, promoting instead the need for a concrete context-sensitive 
test and requiring that law and policy should «promote equality» in order to be conceived 
as constitutional70. Andrews focused on «advantage and disadvantage rather than 
equivalence and distinction, [r]evealing that the opposite of equality is hierarchy, not 
difference, [and] understanding social inequality as vertical rather than horizontal in 
nature»71. 
                                                          
66 C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit., pp. 110-125. Thus this same equality would amount to a 
lack of constraints – instead of liberty (which, as is well known, in exactly these negative terms, according 
to some would have become the «characteristic of the mechanics of our social thought»: see, for example, 
H. KELSEN, La democrazia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995, p. 47). The relationship between equality and 
liberty (above all understood as freedom of speech) is examined in C.A. MACKINNON, Only Words, cit. 
The opposition between equality and privacy is, on the other hand, central to the criticism expressed in 
Privacy vs. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983), in C.A. MACKINNON, Feminism Unmodified. 
Discourses on Life and Law, cit., pp. 93-102. 
67 This same liberty seems to be reabsorbed in this sense and turns out to be instrumental in pursuing 
equality since it is conceived, changing the metaphorical words of Albert Camus, as a kind of «exhausting 
daily struggle» and «cry, followed by a long pain»: A. CAMUS, Mi rivolto dunque siamo. Scritti politici, 
a cura di V. GIACOPINI, Elèuthera, Milano, 2015, p. 136. 
68 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 21. 
69 Supreme Court of Canada, 1989, 1 S.C.R. 143. The case concerned a British citizen, stably residing 
in Canada, who was denied access to forensic activity because he was not a Canadian citizen. See C.A. 
MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., pp. 24-35 and Ead., Substantive Equality: a Perspective, cit., pp. 5-6, 
10. 
70 C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., p. 25. 
71 Ivi, pp. 25-26. 
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After this breakthrough, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada came back 
to perform formal equality in the name of substance72 miring «in a well-intended but 
vacuous and damaging focus on dignitary loss at the sine qua non of inequality. Having 
wriggled at least nominally free of Aristotle, it fell into the grip of Kant»73. In the 2008 
R. v. Kapp case74, however, the Court noted that the concept of dignity is «abstract and 
subjective», and it could be «confusing and difficult to apply», potentially creating 
barriers for disadvantaged groups. Canada returned therefore to the recognition of a 
concrete and material equality, rooted in specific discriminatory backgrounds. 
To this extent, MacKinnon’s view of substantive inequality unequivocally focuses on 
discrimination, i.e. an unjustified or disproportionate treatment or disadvantage 
depending on the membership to a certain oppressed group75, rather than on sameness or 
differences. «Inequality, substantively speaking, is always a social relation of rank 
ordering»76, concretely actualized in specific domains ‒ which could even intersect and 
overlap. Every inequality «fact» is specific and distinctive, but it is always hierarchy that 
marks it77. 
 
3. Critical objections and conclusive remarks  
The analysis proposed in this article aims to bring to light some structural aspects, relevant 
from a legal-philosophical perspective, of MacKinnon’s thought, developed over the 
course of several decades. Below three critical objections are offered, followed by some 
concluding remarks. 
Firstly, it is necessary to point out that the perspective of the American lawyer was 
always and has remained over time militant and ideologically aligned. Particularly in her 
latest publications, she often assumes the tone of a charismatic leader giving motivational 
speeches for the benefit of her target audience. The acumen of some argumentative 
analyses is sometimes eroded by a cogent and assertive narrative approach. If it is true 
that MacKinnon states the ideological slant of her narrative, one must ask oneself whether 
                                                          
72 See the test formulated in Law v. Canada, 1991, 1 S.C.R. 497, pp. 523-524. 
73 C.A. MACKINNON, Butterfly Politics, cit., p. 313. 
74 R. v. Kapp, 2008, 2 S.C.R. 483, p. 504, § 22. 
75 For a definition of “discrimination” in MacKinnon’s words, see C.A. MACKINNON, Sexual 
Harassment of Working Women. A Case of Sex Discrimination, cit., p. 116. 
76 C.A. MACKINNON, Substantive Equality, cit., p. 11. 
77 See ivi, p. 12. 
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that admission is sufficient for rejecting the accusation, and whether being more open to 
criticism would benefit her cause (enabling her, for example, to broaden her spectrum of 
readers). 
Secondly, the postulate of homo mulieri lupus, albeit trimmed of its most cutting 
aspects78, remains controversial. Hypostatizing the conflict between men and women, 
while at the same time presuming the possibility of a universal community of militant 
“sisters”, appears to be quite problematic. This bifurcation could lay itself open to 
essentialist drifts on the diverse nature of genders. Moreover, despite the fact that the 
feminine community is intended as the goal of a process of reclaiming which modifies 
and transforms reality, the risk of a resolution of eros in thanatos, as has been observed 
elsewhere79, remains inescapable. The radical denial of amorous, affectionate or sexual 
relationships between equals, respectful of reciprocal peculiarities80, appears to be an 
alteration of interpersonal dynamics, even counterproductive to the extent that it severs 
the possibility of programmatic sharing of goals to pursue, between men and women. 
Thirdly, MacKinnon’s entire thought takes place within the binary logic of gender. 
Although the jurist has carefully analysed the perspective of lesbian81 and black women82, 
also by using tools from the intersectional method, the one-to-one coincidence between 
women and the oppressed seems to be a simplification in both historical terms as well as 
from the point of view of a pluralist society, where problems of discrimination appear to 
be more complex, resources are limited, and the same actors in the reclaiming processes 
sometimes wish to avoid consolidated categorization. Moreover, this attitude risks 
producing conflict between the same marginalized groups: a “battle of have-nots” which 
often only feeds the dynamics of discrimination. 
Nevertheless, the analysis aimed at a reconfiguration of the concept of equality is 
extremely lucid and subtle, especially where it is intended as a premise which can also be 
integrated, for example, into the articulation of antidiscrimination provisions formulated 
                                                          
78 The approach defined e.g. in C.A. MACKINNON, State of Emergency. Who Will Declare War on 
Terrorism against Women?, in “Women’s Review of Books”, 6, 2002, pp. 7-8 has been mitigated by a 
pacifist lexicon: see, for example, Ead., Butterfly Politics, cit., pp. 305-324.  
79 S. VANTIN, L’eguaglianza di genere tra mutamenti sociali e nuove tecnologie. Percorsi di diritto 
antidiscriminatorio, Pacini, Pisa, 2018, pp. 32-33. 
80 With a literary image, think at the characters of Nora and Ellida in Henrik Ibsen’s dramas (Doll’s 
House, 1879, and The Lady from the Sea, 1889) and at the love relationships they learn to realize.  
81 See, for example, C.A. MACKINNON, Sex Equality, cit., pp. 1073-1201. 
82 See, for example, ivi, pp. 57-143, 428-485. 
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in the European legal context. The proposal to reform the applicability of the equitable 
logic, insisting not on the Aristotelian formula of equal treatment for equals and different 
treatment for those who are different, but rather on a case-by-case approach that can detect 
discrimination incurred by a subject as a component of a given socially oppressed group, 
seems promising. From this perspective, counteracting social hierarchies and the concrete 
disadvantageous treatments that these impose on the weakest, become a fundamental 
consequence.  
